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Case No. 20070918-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Davy Genaro Valenciano, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, a 
second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
In separate points, Defendant attacks the denial of his motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea. Br.Aplt. at 1-3. The State combines its response into one: 
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea? 
Standard of Review: A denial of a motion to withdraw is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, ^ 11, 983 P.2d 556. The court's factual 
findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This appeal is governed by the constitutional standard embodied in UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008) (Addendum A): 
A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of 
the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily 
made. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In October 2006, Defendant was charged with two counts of distribution of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone, first degree felonies, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (West Supp. 2008), and one count 
of possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) (West Supp. 2008) (R. 1-4). The Public 
Defender Association of Weber County [PDA] was appointed to represent 
Defendant (R. 5-6). 
Defendant declines appointment of PDA. 
PDA appeared with Defendant at the preliminary hearing (R. 14-15). But 
when Defendant announced he was hiring a private attorney, the hearing was 
continued (id.). Defendant subsequently hired Ryan Bushnell to represent him (R. 
14-16). Mr. Bushnell filed discovery requests and appeared at the re-scheduled 
preliminary hearing (R. 18-22). The hearing was continued to the next day after the 
magistrate (Judge Roger Dutson) recused himself (R. 21-22). 
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Defendant fires private attorney Bushnell. 
The next day, Defendant appeared at the hearing without an attorney (R. 23-
24). Defendant told the magistrate (Judge Pamela Heffernan) that he had fired Mr. 
Bushnell and had retained a new attorney, Roy Cole (id.). Prior to the hearing, Mr. 
Cole had called the magistrate to confirm the representation and to request a 
continuance, which was granted (id.). Cole filed an appearance of counsel, a request 
for discovery, and a demand for a jury trial (R. 26-31). Bushnell withdrew (R. 32-33). 
Defendant fires private attorney Cole. 
Mr. Cole appeared with Defendant for preliminary hearing, but announced 
that Defendant had fired him and hired another private attorney, Ian R. Vallejo (R. 
35-36). The magistrate continued the hearing (id.). The same day, Mr. Vallejo filed 
an appearance of counsel and requested discovery (R. 34). He also issued a 
subpoena for records of the motel where the drug sale occurred (R. 51-53). 
Defendant fires private attorney Vallejo 
On February 12,2007, Mr. Vallejo appeared with Defendant for preliminary 
hearing (R. 71-73). Vallejo was ready to proceed until, minutes before the hearing, 
Defendant said he wanted to fire him (R. 71-73; R140:3). The magistrate questioned 
Defendant, determined there was no actual conflict, and asked Mr. Vallejo "to 
please represent" Defendant through preliminary hearing (R140: 3-7 & 58). Mr. 
Vallejo agreed and Defendant did not object (R140: 7). 
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The preliminary hearing proceeded. The prosecution called Michael Bell and 
Larry Nelson, who had already pled guilty in connection with this case, and three 
members of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force (R. 140). The magistrate 
found probable cause to support the Information and bound Defendant over for 
trial (R140:59-60). At the hearing's conclusion, the magistrate asked Defendant if he 
still wanted to fire Mr. Vallejo. Defendant replied: "I don't -1 ain't gonna say right 
now. I don't have no idea right now. If I do not fire him or if I'm not" (R140: 61). 
Two months later, Defendant fired Vallejo (R. 76-77). 
Defendant accepts PDA. 
After Mr. Vallejo was fired, Defendant accepted PDA's re-appointment (R. 79-
80). Trial was continued to July 2007 (R. 72 & 85). PDA attorney Michael Bouwhuis 
received a transcript of the preliminary hearing and full discovery (R. 89; R140:2,4). 
Defendant enters an Alford guilty plea to a reduced charge. 
On July 10, 2007, two weeks before trial, Mr. Bouwhuis appeared with 
Defendant for a final pretrial (R. 100-01). Bouwhuis said he had discussed the 
prosecutor's plea offer with Defendant, but Defendant had rejected it (R141: 2). 
Defense counsel explained that Defendant thought he was entitled to see all the 
evidence against him "today" at pretrial (id.). Defense counsel felt an additional 
discovery motion was unnecessary and unsupportable because all of the evidence 
had already been disclosed (R141: 2 & 4). Defense counsel said he had "been over 
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it" with Defendant and the two had spent "lots of time" discussing the case (id.). 
Defendant injected, "my other lawyer wasn't helping me at all" (R141: 3). The 
judge, having witnessed the firings of Bushnell, Cole, and Vallejo, replied, "Well, 
you've had complaints about all the lawyers you've had . . . So what's the problem 
now?" (id.). 
DEFENDANT: The first two didn't even show up for my first court date. 
That's why I got rid of the first one. The second one didn't show up for 
my first court date, so I got rid of him. And then I hired the third one. 
That's -1 only really - really got rid of one that I was really concerned 
about. The other two didn't show up for court. Would you keep 
them? 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Bouwhuis is representing you. What's the 
problem? 
DEFENDANT: I hadn't said nothing about him. 
THE COURT: Well, so - what - what's -
DEFENDANT: I want to have all the evidence brought against me, but 
they haven't. 
THE COURT: You had a -
DEFENDANT: I think they don't have a case. 
THE COURT: Mr. Valenciano, you had a prelim. You want your trial. 
It's scheduled for the 25th, 26th, and 27th. Let's just confirm it right 
now and we'll go to trial on those days. And you work with your 
lawyer. If you want to see information that the State may have against 
you, he - I'm sure that he can get that and you can confer with him on 
it. But we're not going to be doing anything more in the open 
courtroom other than having a trial in this case. 
DEFENDANT: Can I get my motion for discovery? 
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THE COURT: Talk to your lawyer about it. He's - he's the one 
representing you, so I don't -1 would assume the discovery's [sic] been 
produced. 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: It has been. 
(R141: 3-4). See Addendum B. The prosecutor added, "according to my records, 
everything we have has been produced" (R141:4). The court asked defense counsel 
if he would "make time" to answer Defendant's questions, to which counsel replied, 
"I've made a lot of time available to him" (id.). 
The court told Defendant that the pretrial was the last time he could plead to 
a reduced charge; after that, no plea bargains would be allowed (R141: 4-5). The 
court offered to pass the matter so that Defendant could discuss his concerns with 
counsel, but explained that unless counsel asked for the case to be recalled, the court 
would presume they were proceeding to trial as scheduled (R141: 5-6). 
The case was passed, but later recalled when counsel announced that a plea 
agreement had been reached: Defendant would enter an Alford guilty plea to a 
reduced charge of second-degree drug distribution and the remaining charges 
would be dismissed (R141: 7).1 
1
 An Alford plea permits a defendant to plead guilty, without admitting 
culpability, to avoid conviction of a greater offense. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U. 
S. 25, 37 (1970) (requiring a "strong factual basis for the plea"). See also UTAH R. 
CRIM. P. 11(e)(4)(B) (requiring "sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction"). Here, Defendant does not challenge the factual basis supporting his 
plea. SeeBr.Aplt.SLt8 10-11. 
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The court conducted a colloquy with Defendant, fully informing him of his 
rights pursuant to rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 Defense counsel 
went over a written Statement in Advance of Plea "word by word" with Defendant 
that day and twice previously in his office (R141: 9). The Statement was signed by 
Defendant and incorporated into the record (id.). See Add. B. The prosecutor 
proffered facts supporting the charges (R141: 16-17). The court found, based on 
those facts, that there was a substantial likelihood that Defendant would be 
convicted if he went to trial (R141:17).3 
Throughout the colloquy, Defendant confirmed that he understood the rights 
he was waiving by entering a guilty plea, that he was not under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs, and that he was voluntarily choosing to plead guilty, even though 
he disputed some facts and was not admitting culpability (R141: 7-17). The court 
recognized that Defendant felt he was not guilty, but warned that the court was 
2
 Rule 11 "is designed to protect an individual's rights when entering a guilty 
plea by ensuring that the defendant receives full notice of the charges, the elements, 
how the defendant's conduct amount to a crime, [and] the consequences of the 
plea[.]" State v. Bluemel, 2007 UT 90, % 17,173 P.3d 842 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). Defendant concedes that the court complied with rule 11, but 
claims the plea was not knowing and voluntary. See Br.Aplt. at 8 & 10-11. 
Apart from the prosecutor's proffer, the judge was familiar with the 
evidence supporting the charges because the judge presided over the preliminary 
hearing and bound Defendant over for trial (R. 71-72). See State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 
666,674 (Utah App. 1993) (recognizing that the factual basis for a plea may include 
the preliminary hearing evidence). 
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"going to be sentencing you as if you are, in fact, guilty of a second degree 
felony" (R141:14-15). The court also warned that even if Defendant timely moved to 
withdraw the plea, it was highly unlikely the court would allow it (R141: 13-14). 
After Defendant said he understood, the court accepted the plea as knowing and 
voluntary (R141:17). See Add. B. 
Defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Before sentencing, Defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
alleging that he was under "duress" when he entered the plea (R. 111). In a 
supporting affidavit, he alleged that: (1) his attorney "misled" him "regarding the 
nature of the evidence;" (2) Defendant "did not get to see all the evidence;" (3) he 
felt he was not guilty; and (4) he had been "continually harassed by one of the police 
officers involved in the case" (R. 112-13).4 See Addendum C. Defense counsel 
explained that Defendant believed that "there's a contradiction in the [police] 
reports" regarding the motel room he rented (where the drug sale occurred) and 
Defendant felt the alleged contradiction "should have been attacked" (R142:3). The 
prosecutor argued that Defendant's generalized allegations lacked evidentiary 
support and did not establish that the plea was not knowing or voluntary, as 
required under section 77-13-6(2)(a) (R. 116-18). The court agreed. After reviewing 
4
 The affidavit also alleged that Defendant's wife "planted" the drugs found 
on him, but the allegation was stuck-out by Defendant (R. 112). 
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a tape of the plea colloquy, the court concluded that the plea was knowing and 
voluntary and that Defendant offered no valid reason for its withdrawal (R142:3-5). 
See Addendum D. 
On October 9, 2007, the court sentenced Defendant to one-to-fifteen years 
imprisonment, to run concurrently with a sentence imposed in another case (R. 125). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 131). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS5 
Michael Bell had no idea that he had just sold $200.00 of methamphetamine to 
an undercover police officer (R140:13,26). So when the undercover officer asked 
Bell if he could get more methamphetamine, Bell readily agreed (id.). Within 
minutes, Bell and a cohort, Larry Nelson, drove to Motel 6, where Nelson purchased 
an ounce of methamphetamine from Defendant with money supplied by Bell (R140: 
11-14,19-20). Bell, Nelson, and Defendant were immediately arrested (R140: 30). 
* * * 
On October 27, 2006, Strike Force Undercover Agent Reid arranged to buy 
methamphetamine from Michael Bell (R140: 25-26). Reid hoped to purchase 
5
 Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the facts supporting his plea. 
See note 1, supra. Nevertheless, the facts presented at preliminary hearing are 
relevant to Defendant's claims that his plea should be vacated because he was 
"confused" by the evidence and his counsel failed to adequately resolve this 
confusion before he pled. See BrAplt. at 14-15 & 21. Defendant also contends that all 
of his counsel failed to adequately discuss the facts with him and that if they had, he 
would not have pled guilty. BrAplt. at 23. 
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$1000.00 (about an ounce) of methamphetamine (R140:26). Reid photographed the 
Strike Force funds he would use for the purchase (R140: 26). 
Reid met Bell to make the purchase, but Bell only had two hundred dollars' 
worth of methamphetamine (R140: 25-26). Reid purchased the methamphetamine 
with two of the photographed $100.00 bills and then asked Bell to get more 
methamphetamine (id.). Bell agreed. Bell contacted Larry Nelson, who said he 
could get "dope" from someone at Motel 6 (R140:11,13,16 & 18). 
The Strike Force already had information that drugs were being sold from a 
second floor room at Motel 6 (R140: 30-31 & 42). When it appeared that Bell and 
Nelson were headed for the motel, surveillance was set up there. 
Bell parked in the motel's parking lot. Because he did not know Nelson's 
source, Bell planned to the lot while Nelson bought the drugs (R140:14, 26). Bell 
gave Nelson $800.00, which included the $200.00 that Reid had just paid Bell (R140: 
11,18-19).6 Nelson walked to the second floor and entered room 205 (R140:19,33-
34). Minutes later, Nelson exited room 205 with nearly one ounce, 27 grams, of 
methamphetamine, which he gave to Bell (id.). 
As Bell drove away with the methamphetamine, he was arrested (R140:11,27, 
30). Bell admitted that Nelson had purchased the 27 grams for him so that Bell 
6
 Agent Reid did not advance money for the anticipated drug purchase, but 
had paid $200.00 for the drugs Bell had already sold him (R140:11-13,26). 
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could sell it to Reid (R140; 11-13). Nelson was also arrested (R140:30,34,44-45). He 
told the Strike Force that he had purchased 27 grams of methamphetamine from 
"Davy" in room 205 and identified Davy's car in the parking lot (R140:19,36,45). 
Meanwhile, officers maintained surveillance on room 205. Defendant exited 
the room and drove away in the car Nelson had identified as Davy's (R140: 35). 
Defendant was stopped and identified himself as Davy Valenciano (R140: 35-36). 
He consented to a search of his car (R140: 37). A digital scale and "o" sheets were 
found underneath the car's dashboard (R140: 37-38).7 Defendant was searched. 
Two baggies of methamphetamine, weighing 3.9 ounces and 6.9 ounces, were in his 
pants pocket (R140: 38-40,46-48). A wad of cash was hidden up his pant leg. The 
cash, totaling $2100.00, included the two $100.00 bills Agent Reid gave Bell and Bell 
gave Nelson (R140: 40-41,46-48). 
Rooms 205 and 206 were searched pursuant to warrant (R140:50). The rooms 
were connected by an interior door, which was unlocked and open, allowing free 
access between the two rooms (id.). A rental receipt for room 206 was in 
Defendant's name (id.). A glass methamphetamine pipe, which Defendant admitted 
was his, was found in room 206 (R140: 50-51). 
7
 A digital scale is commonly used to weigh narcotics (R140: 37-38). "O" 
sheets are basically drug sale ledgers, listing drug purchasers and the amounts they 
owe the dealer (R140: 38). 
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Bell and Nelson pled guilty to felony drug charges and were called as 
prosecution witnesses at Defendant's preliminary hearing (R140: 11, 17-18). Bell 
fully testified (R140:10-16). Nelson, who had not yet been sentenced, testified in 
part - admitting that he purchased methamphetamine in room 205 and that 
Defendant ("Davy") was in the room - but invoking the Fifth Amendment when 
asked if he had arranged the sale directly with Defendant (R140: 21). Three 
members of the Strike Force, including Agent Reid, also testified at the hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Utah, a guilty plea may be withdrawn only if it is not knowing and 
voluntary. A guilty plea is presumed to be knowing and voluntary if it is entered in 
compliance with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. But the converse is not 
true— non-compliance with rule 11 does not demonstrate that a plea was not 
knowing and voluntary. 
Here, Defendant concedes that his plea is presumed valid. See Br.Aplt. at 8 & 
10-11. Nevertheless, he contends it is not knowing and voluntary because (1) he was 
confused concerning the evidence against him and (2) his counsel failed to 
adequately explain the evidence to him and pressured him into pleading. Defendant 
asserts that if his counsel had adequately discussed the facts with him, he would not 
have pled guilty. 
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The merits of Defendant's claims should not be considered because he fails to 
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's denial of the motion to withdraw. 
Moreover, some of his arguments are not preserved. Alternatively, if the merits are 
considered, the record supports the trial court's ruling. 
Defendant heard the evidence against him at preliminary hearing and, 
through counsel, received full discovery. The evidence was not complicated. Bell 
unwittingly agreed to sell methamphetamine to an undercover officer. Bell used 
Nelson as a middleman. Nelson purchased the methamphetamine from Defendant 
and then gave the drugs to Bell. Bell was arrested with the drugs and Defendant 
was arrested with the money and other items evidencing drug dealing. Though 
Defendant believed there was a discrepancy concerning which motel room he 
rented, he discussed the matter with counsel and then knowingly and voluntarily 
chose to plead guilty to a reduced charge to avoid conviction on greater offenses. 
In denying the motion to withdraw, the trial court reviewed the plea colloquy 
hearing. The court correctly found nothing to support that the plea was not 
knowing or voluntary. Consequently, there was no basis to vacate the plea. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY 
GUILTY PLEA 
In 2003, Utah narrowed the basis upon which a guilty plea may be 
withdrawn. Whereas before, a plea could be withdrawn for "good cause," Utah law 
now permits a guilty plea to be withdrawn only upon "a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily entered." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6 (West Supp. 2008). 
This is a constitutional standard. Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993) 
(recognizing that whether a plea is knowing and voluntary is a constitutional 
determination). This constitutional standard, unlike the former "good cause" 
standard, does not require that a guilty plea strictly comply with rule 11, Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. Compare Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (holding that "a failure to 
comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does not" render a plea 
unknowing or involuntary), with State v. Brocksmith, 888 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah App. 
1994) (applying pre-2003 law and holding that a failure to comply with rule 11 
constitutes "good cause" to withdraw a plea). Nevertheless, when a guilty plea is 
entered in compliance with rule 11, the plea is presumed to be knowing and 
voluntary. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, ^  22,26 P.3d 203; State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 
44,111,1 P.3d 1108. 
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Here, Defendant acknowledges his heavy burden in establishing that his plea 
was not knowing and voluntary. He concedes that the trial court fully complied 
with rule 11 in accepting his plea and, therefore, the plea is presumed valid. Br.Aplt 
at 10-11. Nevertheless, Defendant contends that his plea is not knowing and 
voluntary because he was confused and his counsel was ineffective. Br.Aplt at 14-16 
& 21-23. Consequently, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
not permitting the plea's withdrawal. Br.Aplt at 2 & 23. 
Defendant's claim has narrowed over time. In the trial court, Defendant filed 
a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming the plea was entered under 
"duress" (R. 111). He further alleged that: (1) his attorney "misled" him concerning 
the evidence; (2) Defendant did not personally see all the evidence; (3) he felt he was 
not guilty; and (4) he was "continually harassed by one of the police officers involve 
in the case" (R. 112-13). See Add. C. Defense counsel explained that Defendant 
believed there was a "contradiction" in the police reports about which room he 
rented and that the rental receipt for room 206 was not signed by him (R. 142: 2-3). 
But as Defendant admits on appeal, he presented no evidence and proffered no facts 
to support these allegations. Br.Aplt. at 9. The trial court found that the allegations 
established no basis to set aside the plea (R142: 3-5). 
On appeal, Defendant abandons some of his allegations and modifies others. 
He no longer claims that his plea should be vacated because he is not guilty or 
15 
because of the claimed police harassment. Instead, he asserts that when he pled, he 
was confused by the evidence and his counsel pressured him into pleading without 
resolving the confusion. BrAplt. at 14-16 & 21-23. He contends that he could not 
"intelligently" elect to plead because he did not "understand" the evidence against 
him. BrAplt at 11. 
The Court should not consider the merits of Defendant's claims because he 
fails to marshal the evidence that supports the trial court's ruling. See State 
v.Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 13, 983 P.3d 536; State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 
191, t 20,186 P.3d 1023. Although Defendant candidly admits that his motion to 
withdraw was not supported by legal memorandum or evidentiary facts, BrAplt. at 
9, he fails to marshal "every scrap of competent evidence" that supports the trial 
court's ruling and contradicts his assertions. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, 
\ 20. Compare Defendant's Statement of the Case & Statement of Facts, BrAplt at 7-
10, with the State's Statement of the Case & Statement of Facts, supra. The Court, 
therefore, may summarily reject his claims. See Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, ^ [ 13; Chavez-
Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 20. Additionally, the Court should decline to consider 
the merits of claims Defendant raises for the first time on appeal. See Chavez-
Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 7. Alternatively, even if the merits are considered, the 
record negates Defendant's allegations and supports the trial court's ruling. 
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A. Defendant's claim that he was confused when he entered his plea 
lacks merit. 
Defendant claims that his "confusion" at the time of the plea was evident 
because, earlier in the final pretrial hearing, he voiced his desire for additional 
discovery. Br. Aplt at 13. The claim lacks merit. 
Defendant initially discovered the evidence against him during the 
preliminary hearing, where two co-defendants and three Strike Force officers 
testified concerning the October 27th drug dealings. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
Additionally, the prosecutor complied with the discovery requests filed by 
Defendant's various counsel and, by the final pretrial, had disclosed all of the State's 
evidence (R141: 4). Defense counsel thoroughly discussed this evidence with 
Defendant on multiple occasions before Defendant entered his plea (R141: 2-4). 
Indeed, despite Defendant's claim that his counsel did not discuss the evidence with 
him, Br .Aplt at 13-15, Defendant was sufficiently familiar with the police reports 
and physical evidence that he could claim that a "contradiction" existed in the 
reports about which room he rented and that the rental receipt for room 206 did not 
include his signature (R142: 3).8 
At the time of the plea, Defendant expressed no dissatisfaction with Mr. 
Bouwhuis's representation (R141:2-3). Consequently, when it became apparent that 
8
 The State does not concede Defendant's allegations are true, but only that he 
asserted them. 
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Defendant was passing up his last opportunity to plea to a reduced charge that 
would reduce two potential life sentences to one fifteen-year sentence, the Court 
wisely allowed Defendant additional time to discuss the offer with his counsel 
(R141:6). See Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 17 (recognizing that it is appropriate to allow 
a defendant additional time to consider a plea). 
Following this interlude, Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered an 
Alford guilty plea. As the trial court found, Defendant evidenced no confusion in 
entering the plea: Defendant "knew what [he was] doing" (R142: 4). The record 
supports this finding. During the colloquy, Defendant clearly stated that he 
understood that a guilty plea would waive his rights to challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence, to confront the prosecution witnesses, and to present his own evidence 
(R141:10-11). Add. B. Following the prosecutor's proffer of the factual basis for the 
charges, the court told Defendant that even though he was not admitting these facts, 
the court was accepting them as true (R141:14-15,16-17). Throughout the colloquy, 
Defendant consistently evidenced his understanding of the implications of his plea 
and never voiced confusion or hesitation in entering it (R141:7-17). See Add. B. This 
record refutes Defendant's claim that his earlier confusion regarding discovery 
undercut the knowing and voluntary nature of his subsequent plea. See Benvenuto, 
1999 UT 60, t1f 17-18 & 22 (holding that vacillation and hesitancy leading up to a 
plea does not necessarily render the plea unknowing or involuntary). 
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Defendant also raises new unpreserved claims on appeal, the merits of which 
should not be considered. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, % 7. Defendant 
claims for the first time on appeal that he thought if he entered an Alford plea, he 
could review the evidence and withdraw his plea before sentencing. See BrAplt at 
14-15. It is true that a defendant who pleads guilty may move to withdraw the plea 
before he is sentenced. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(1) (Add. A). But Defendant 
claims more than this: he claims he thought an Alford plea entitled him to withdraw 
his plea. Cf. BrAplt. at 14-15. The court clearly informed him otherwise. The court 
warned Defendant that it was unlikely that a motion to withdraw would be 
granted, even if timely filed, and that his Alford plea would be treated as any other 
guilty plea in sentencing (R141:13-14). 
Defendant also contends for the first time that he did not "understand the 
nature and value of any promises made to him/' See BrAplt at 16. But Defendant 
fails to explain what promise he misunderstood or did not receive. The record 
establishes that only one promise was made to Defendant: the prosecution would 
reduce one first-degree felony to a second-degree felony and would dismiss the 
other charges (R141: 7-10). This promise was kept (id.). 
In sum, the trial court properly rejected Defendant's vague and unsupported 
claim that he was "confused" at the time he entered the plea (R142: 3-5). 
19 
B. Defendant's claims that his attorney failed to adequately consult 
with him and unduly pressured him into pleading guilty lack 
merit. 
Below, Defendant complained repeatedly that his first two counsel, Mr. 
Bushnell and Mr. Cole, failed to appear at hearings and that Mr. Vallejo was "a 
concern." See Statement of the Case, supra. He repeated these claims during the final 
pretrial, but not during the plea colloquy (R141:2-3). Defendant stated that his prior 
counsel did not "help" him, but raised no complaint about Mr. Bouwhuis, who then 
represented him (id.). 
In moving to withdraw his plea, Defendant alleged for the first time that he 
was "misled by my attorney concerning the evidence against me" (R. 112). He did 
not, however, specify which attorney he was referring to or how he was misled. The 
court did not specifically address the issue, other than to agree with the prosecutor 
that all of Defendant's claims were vague and unsupported and did not undermine 
the knowing or voluntary nature of the plea (R. 116-18; R142: 3-5). 
Defendant impermissibly expands this argument for the first time on appeal. 
See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, ^ 7. He now contends that Mr. Bouwhuis 
was ineffective because he pressured Defendant to plead guilty without addressing 
or resolving Defendant's confusion over discovery. See Br.Aplt at 21. He also 
claims for the first time that Mr. Bouwhuis and his former counsel failed to provide 
him with discovery materials or discuss the evidence with him and that if they had, 
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he would not have pled guilty. See Br.Aplt at 21-23. The merits of these new claims 
should not be considered. See Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, f 7. In any case, 
the record does not support Defendant's allegations. 
To establish ineffectiveness of counsel, Defendant must demonstrate that his 
counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell "below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment" and "'that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Martinez, 2001 UT 
12, f1f 16-17 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In the 
context of a guilty plea, this requires Defendant to establish that "but for counsel's 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." 
Id. at 1f 17 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). Ultimately, however, 
"ineffectiveness of counsel that contributes to a flawed guilty plea . . . can spare a 
defendant the consequences of [his] plea only if the defendant makes out the same 
case required of every defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea: that the plea was 
not knowing and voluntary." State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, If 13,167 P.3d 1046. 
As the trial court noted during the final pretrial, Defendant regularly 
complained of and fired his attorneys (R141: 3). See also Statement of Case, supra. 
Defendant falsely claimed that his first two attorneys, Mr. Bushnell and Mr. Cole, 
failed to appear for hearings (R141: 2-3). But see Statement of the Case, supra. He 
suggested that Mr. Vallejo was a "concern" based on his performance on the 
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preliminary hearing (R141: 2-3). But see R140 (demonstrating Vallejo's effective 
representation at preliminary hearing). Yet, when Defendant moved to withdraw 
his plea, he did not raise these complaints as a ground to withdraw the plea. 
Instead, he claimed he "was misled by my attorney" concerning the evidence 
against him (R. 112-13). In the trial court, even Defendant recognized that his 
complaints with former counsel had no bearing on his guilty plea, because these 
attorneys did not represent Defendant when he pled. Defendant's contrary claim on 
appeal - that his former counsel's performances infected his guilty plea - should be 
summarily rejected as unpreserved and without merit. 
On the other hand, Mr. Bouwhuis represented Defendant when the plea was 
entered and for the three months leading up to the plea (R. 79-80 & 100-01). Mr. 
Bouwhuis reviewed the preliminary hearing evidence and all discovery materials 
and then spent "a lot" of time discussing the case with Defendant (R141:2-4). Twice 
before the final pretrial, Bouwhuis discussed the plea offer with Defendant, and 
explained the rights Defendant would be waiving if he pled (R141:8-9). On the last 
day a plea bargain was possible, Bouwhuis again discussed the reduced plea offer 
with Defendant and again explained "word by word" the rights Defendant would 
be waiving if he pled (id.). 
Despite this record, Defendant claims for the first time on appeal that Mr. 
Bouwhuis provided ineffective assistance of counsel in that he failed to adequately 
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discuss the evidence with Defendant, failed to clarify Defendant's "confusion" 
before he pled, and unduly pressured Defendant into a "speedy" plea. BrAplt at 15 
& 21. Because the issue was not preserved, its merits should not be considered. See 
Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, \ 7. In any case, the record belies the claim. See 
facts discussed, supra. See also Statement of the Case, supra. 
The only preserved claim regarding Mr. Bouwhuis is the one raised in 
Defendant's pro se motion to withdraw where Defendant claimed "his attorney" 
misled him. Though the allegation was not specific, Mr. Bouwhuis interpreted it to 
mean that he should have attacked the "contradiction" Defendant alleged 
concerning which motel room he rented (R142: 3). During the hearing on the 
motion to withdraw, Defendant did not dispute Mr. Bouwhuis's interpretation of 
his claim (id.) 
The facts establish no ineffectiveness. Even assuming arguendo that an 
"evidentiary conflict" existed, attacking it would have been of no avail. At the 
preliminary hearing, Nelson admitted that he went to room 205 to buy 
methamphetamine and that Defendant was in the room when he bought the drugs. 
See Statement of Facts, supra. When asked if he arranged the sale with Defendant, 
Nelson invoked the Fifth Amendment (R140: 21). An officer testified that when 
Nelson was arrested, he admitted that he arranged the sale with Davy and 
identified Davy's car (R140: 45). Surveillance officers saw Defendant, known as 
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"Davy/7 exit room 205 after the sale and drive away in the car identified by Nelson. 
When stopped, Defendant had hidden on him the money from the drug sale plus 
ten ounces of methamphetamine; a digital scale and "o" sheets were hidden in his 
car. See Statement of Facts, supra. A subsequent search of the motel established that 
rooms 205 and 206 were connected by an adjoining door and that Defendant left a 
glass methamphetamine pipe in room 206. See id. In sum, it makes no difference 
which motel room, if any, was rented to Defendant. 
Defendant fails to establish that Mr. Bouwhuis's representation undermined 
the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea. Consequently, the trial court 
properly found no basis to grant the motion to withdraw. 
CONCLUSION 
The denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted September^^2008. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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Addendum A 
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a 
showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in 
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be 
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in Abeyance, a motion to withdraw 
the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in Subsection 
(2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and 
Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Laws 1980, c 15, § 2; Laws 1989, c 65, § 1; Laws 1994, c 16, § 1; Laws 2003, c 290, § 1, eff. May 5, 
2003; Laws 2004, c. 90, § 91, eff. May 3,2004; Laws 2008, c. 3, § 251, eft Feb. 7,2008. 
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Defendant's letter 
CD19800223
 D a a e s . 
061904066 VALENCIANO.DAVYGENARO 
Ut 
MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS (# 6498) 
PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC., 
OF WEBER COUNTY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2562 Washington Boulevard 
Osden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 392-8247 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
2007AU6-9 PH 3^32 
MO 1 0 2007 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAW VALENCIANO, 
Defendant. 
I AFFIDAVIT OF D A W 
I VALENCIANO 
1 CASE No. 061904066 
| JUDGE PAMEIAHEFFERNAN 
State of Utah ) 
:S.S. 
County of Weber ) 
Davy Genaro Valenciano, beins first and duly sworn, upon his oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. On July 10, 2007,1 entered an Alford Plea of Guilty to a Distribution of a Controlled 
Substance, a second degree felony. 
2. On July 17,2007,1 spoke with my Attorney, Michael Bouwhuis, and notified him that 
I would like to have my plea withdrawn based on the following reason(s): 
a. I feel that I was misled regarding the nature of the evidence against me. 
b. I did not get to see all the evidence against me. 
c. I feel that I am not guilty. 
d. ^Ay^wfepldl iled U \<d diugs oi u i KB 
FIDAVIT OF DAVY VALENCIANO 
CD19764467 pages: 
STATE OF UTAH VS DAVY VALENCIANU 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVY GENARO VALENCIANO 
Case No. 061904066 
e. I have been continually harassed by one of the police officers involved in the 
case. 
DATED this 8 day of Ausust, of 2007. 
DAWVAKNCIANO 
AFFIANT 
'#*%/^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this *ft day of Ausust, of 2007. 
MATTHEW MAIER 
*0U*YHBLK-$T*TE0F(m 
721W12TH STRICT 
OGOEN.UT 84404 
COMM. EXP. 04*05.2011 
Notary Public 
Residins in Weber County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
2 
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Addendum C 
Addendum C 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC., 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
2562 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone:(801) 392-8247 
Fax:(801)334-7275 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
JUL 1 0 2007 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA 
AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
vs. 
-kg vj l/tt/f/f c / V fi fr 
Defendant. 
Case No. 0bl^64^(o(o 
JUDGE / w ^ ? *V>*«74? 
I, j hereby acknowledge and certify that 
have been advised of and that I understand the following facts and rights; 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
am pleading guilty (or no contest) to the following crimes: 
DEGREE 
B. 
C. 
D. 
md c« 
CD19713088
 p a q e s . 
061904066 VALENCIANO,DAVYGENARO 
PUNISHMENT 
MIN/AAAX AND/OR 
CRIMES* STATUTORY 
PROVISION 
A P / p - h ^ U / f r ^ , &F —-
I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or had it 
read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading 
guilty (or no contest). 
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are: 
I understand that by pleading guilty, I will be admitting that I committed the crimes listed 
above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the foregoing 
crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or contest) that 
the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the Court to accept my guilty (or no contest) 
pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest): 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights under the 
constitutions of Utah and the United States. I also understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest) 
I will give up all the following rights: 
COUNSEL: I know that I have the risht to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot 
afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I understand that I 
misht later, if the Judge determined that I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
I have not waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have done 
so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reason.-
If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that I 
understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty (or 
no contest). I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the consequences of 
my guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is /^^t/<^J^
€£^ / ^ r . 
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of my 
guilty (or no contest) plea(s). 
JuRy TRIAL. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial (unbiased) 
jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). 
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, (a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testified against me and 
(b) by my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the opportunity to 
cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified against me. 
RIGHT TO COMPEL WITNESSES. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call witnesses if I 
choose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of 
the witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the State would pay 
those costs. 
RIGHT TO TESTIFY AND PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. I know that if I were to have a jury 
trial, I would have the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I choose not to testify, 
no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself. I also know that if I 
choose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify against 
me. 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF. I know that if I do not plead guilty (or no 
contest), I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s) If 
I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty" and my case will be set 
for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) 
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous, meaning 
that each juror would have to find me guilty. 
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of innocence 
and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. 
APPEAL. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or judge, I 
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the costs of an 
appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up my right to 
appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest). 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all the 
statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY (OR NO CONTEST) PLEA 
POTENTIAL PENALTIES. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each crime 
to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no contest) to a 
crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory penalty 
for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any 
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of a plea agreement. 
CONSECUTIVE/CONCURRENT PRISON TERMS. I know that if there is more than one crime involved, 
the sentence may be imposed one after the other (consecutively), or they may run at the same 
time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each crime that I plead 
to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of 
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no contest), my guilty (or no 
contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences beins imposed on me. If the offense 
to which I am now pleadins guilty occurred when I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law 
requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the Court finds and states on the 
record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate. 
PLEA BARGAIN: My guilty (or no contest) plea(s) (is/are not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea 
bargain, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
£x^z^Q f/j^j}^77z±fi r*fy>\s€*£ 
- ^ ^ *^^*-Tsf./? gs/P<M*. 6^<Z» *-
TRIAL JUDGE NOT BOUND. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for 
sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not 
binding on the Judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe 
the Judge may do are not binding on the Judge. 
DEFENDANT'S CERTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARINESS 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats ox unlawful 
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no contest). No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attomey, and I understand 
its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that I am free to change or delete 
anything contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes because all of the 
statements are correct. 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney 
I am 3 3 years of age I have attended school through the / / Grade I can read 
and understand the English Language If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been 
provided to me I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants which 
would impair my judgement when I decided to plead guilty I am not presently under the 
influence of any drug, medications or intoxicants which impair my judgement 
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea I am free of any mental 
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am doing or 
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my plea 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must file a 
written motion to withdraw my plea(s) prior to sentencing I will be allowed to withdraw my 
plea only if I show good cause Once I am sentenced, I lose my right to withdraw my plea 
DATED this / Q day of _ , 20^ *7 
'DEFENDANT / 
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for , the defendant 
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her, I have 
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its contents 
and is mentally and physically competent To the best of my knowledge and belief, after an 
appropriate investigation, the elements of the cnme(s) and the factual synopsis of the 
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated, and these, along with the other 
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate 
and true 
TORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
BAR NO <S < ^ P p 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY , 
certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case asainst 
, defendant. I have reviewed this statement of defendant and find that the 
factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true and 
correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourase a plea has been offered 
defendant. The plea nesotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached Plea 
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to 
believe that the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the offense(s) for 
which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) is/are entered and that 
the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. 
ORDER 
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in Court, the Court witnesses the 
signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely, knowingly and 
voluntarily made. 
It is hereby ordered that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the crime(s) set 
forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this day of 
/ 
* n o 
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PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
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HONORABLE PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
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FOR THE STATE: MS. SANDRA L . CORP 
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141 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Davy Valenciano, 
61904066. 
Go ahead, Mr. Bouwhuis. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Your Honor, this is the time set for 
pretrial. This is scheduled for a jury trial later this 
month. 
Just for the Court's information, there has been an 
offer made and relayed to Mr. Valenciano. He's rejected 
that. He — I think the Court's very familiar with him. I 
read the preliminary hearing transcript. 
He asked me — and I told him I would not make this 
request. He wants to request that all the evidence against 
him be shown here today. There was a preliminary hearing 
held in the case. We've been over it. 
THE COURT: Yeah. I don't quite understand where 
you're coming from with that request because you've got a 
lawyer. I assume that you — that he could do the discovery, 
go through the discovery process, obtain information the 
State may have that may, you know, prove that you're guilty, 
which you're entitled to. 
But we had the prelim, and beyond that, nothing is 
required to happen in this courtroom other than a trial. 
THE DEFENDANT: Well, I'm not familiar with the 
court system at all, but I feel my other lawyer wasn't 
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And you work with your lawyer. If you want to see 
information that the State may have against you, he — I'm 
sure that he can get that and you can confer with him on it. 
But we're not going to be doing anything more in the open 
courtroom other than having a trial in this case. 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I get my motion for discovery? 
THE COURT: Talk to your lawyer about it. He's — 
he's the one representing you, so I don't — I would assume 
the discovery's been produced. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: It has been. 
MS. CORP: Your Honor, I have produced — well, this 
file wasn't mine originally, but according to my records, 
everything we have has been produced. If there's something 
specific that they feel is missing, I'll be glad to have 
Mr. Bouwhuis look at my file and talk to the police officers. 
There's nothing that we're trying to hide from the defendant. 
THE COURT: Okay. And you need — your obligation 
in this is to keep in touch with your lawyer to ask him the 
questions that you want answered. 
And I'd ask, Mr. Bouwhuis, that you just make time 
available for him to answer his questions and — 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I've made a lot of time available for 
him. 
THE COURT: But just so that you also know, this is 
the last court date before your trial, so today is the last 
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day to consider any kind of a plea negotiation. After today, 
I will not accept a plea to less than what's charged or a 
complete dismissal by the State. 
THE DEFENDANT: I can't have another date? 
THE COURT: I don't have another date before your 
trial. I — this is the day we set for the pretrial for that 
very reason. So this- is the day to decide, either you want 
to do that or we confirm the trial and go ahead with the 
trial, absent the State moving to dismiss the case for some 
reason. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, just for Your Honor's 
information, he was considering whether or not he wanted to 
have a bench trial or a jury trial. I told him he would need 
to make that decision here. 
THE COURT: There — there was a request made for a 
jury trial, so it's on the docket as a jury trial. 
THE DEFENDANT: I didn't ask for it. 
THE COURT: Well, it — it's — in a case like this, 
Mr. Valenciano, it's normally assumed that you -- you'd be 
getting a jury trial. You know, you certainly can have a 
right to waive that right, but that would have to be done 
after careful consideration with your lawyer on that. And 
I'd — I'd need to take a full waiver of your right to a jury 
trial. These are two first degree felonies. They have 
serious consequences if you're convicted. 
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So, you know, it's important that you make those 
decisions seriously and after consulting with your lawyer 
about it. 
If you want, I can pass it and you can discuss it 
with him and see if — put it back on later and see if he's 
interested in taking any kind of negotiated offer. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Let's pass it, if we may, and come 
back — 
THE COURT: Okay. If you want me to recall it — 
otherwise, I'm assuming that it's going to go ahead just as 
we've scheduled it — 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. So we just recall it today if 
he's changed his mind. 
THE COURT: Yeah. If you've got something else you 
need to talk to me about. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Otherwise — 
MR. BOUWHUIS: All right. Thank you. 
THE COURT: — otherwise I'm going to assume it will 
go as a jury trial. 
(Break in proceedings on this case.) 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Your Honor, we can recall Davy 
Valenciano. It's number 12. 
THE COURT: Recall Davy Valenciano. This is a court 
reporter case. 61904066. 
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MR. BOUWHUIS: We won't actually need a reporter for 
this. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Your Honor, we've reached a 
resolution on this case. The State has agreed to amend 
Count 1 to a second degree felony and dismiss the remaining 
counts. He'll enter an Alford plea to Count 1 as amended. 
MS. CORP: Your Honor, if we could do the reduction 
by striking the language that it was in a drug-free zone. It 
would be a simple distribution. 
THE COURT: All right. What I'm going to do is read 
to you the elements of the offense that you're admitting to 
by entering a plea of guilty. I'll just take it and then ask 
questions. 
Had you gone to trial on the charge as amended, the 
State would have to prove the following elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt before you could be convicted of anything. 
They would specifically have to prove that you 
distributed or arranged to distribute a controlled substance, 
a second degree felony. 
They would have to prove that you knowingly and 
intentionally distributed a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, or agreed, consented, offered, or arranged to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; to wit, 
methamphetamine. 
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They've asked that the enhancement language that it 
was in a drug-free zone be stricken. That makes it a second 
degree felony. 
Do you understand the elements? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm — I'm concerned a little bit 
because there seems — along, throughout this case, there've 
oftentimes been some misunderstandings I think, at least 
misunderstandings to the point where I've got some concern 
and I want to make sure that you know what you're doing today 
and this is, in fact, what you do want to do. 
Do you understand what's going on? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Yes? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I read to you the elements. 
Do you understand the charge as amended? 
THE DEFENDANT: (No response.) 
THE COURT: Do you understand it? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT; That's what the State would have to 
prove had you gone to trial. They'd have to prove that 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
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THE COURT: Did you read the statement in support of 
the guilty plea? That document in front of you. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I read it to him word for word. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Bouwhuis. 
And when that was read to you, did you understand 
what was read? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: For the record, Your Honor, I've 
also, in addition to meeting with him here today, met with 
him two other times in my office to discuss this case. 
THE COURT: Okay. Because of the — kind of the 
ongoing problems that we've had, you know, in terms of 
communication, if you will, I just want to make sure all the 
rights are gone through clearly. 
It -- itTs an offense that carries 1 to 15 years at 
the Utah State Prison. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Right now I don't know a lot about what 
happened here in this case. I'm going to get a presentence 
report. But there is a pos — a distinct possibility you 
could serve time at the Utah State Prison if you plead 
guilty. 
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Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you could serve the 1 to 15 years, 
and up to $10,000 in fines. 
Do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Did you, in fact, sign the 
document, the Statement in Support of a Guilty Plea? This 
document. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. And I'll make it part of the 
record based on the representations that you've given me that 
you read and — that it was read to you and that you 
understood it. And I'm relying on that to make a part of the 
record to support your plea. 
You have a right against compulsory 
self-incrimination. That means you don't have to say 
anything that would incriminate you. In other words, you 
don't have to plead guilty. That would be incriminating 
yourself. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Instead of pleading guilty, you 
have a right to a speedy public trial before an impartial 
jury, and at your trial you're presumed innocent of all the 
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charges. 
You have a right to bring in witnesses by subpoena. 
If you couldn't afford to pay the costs of that, to bring in 
witnesses into court, the State would have to pay for that. 
At your trial you have a right to be present in the 
same room when the witnesses testify against you. 
And you have a right to assist your attorney in 
cross-examining and challenging those witnesses that are 
brought in against you at trial. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. You have a constitutional right 
not to testify at your trial. If you exercise that right, no 
one can assume you're guilty or assume anything negative 
about you as a result of that. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: However, if you plead guilty, you're 
giving up your right against self-incrimination and a right 
to simply remain silent and make the State prove the case. 
Do you understand? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: I've told you what you're charged with; 
I've told you what the potential penalties are. Do you 
understand those could be imposed? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Has anybody promised you anything 
different than that? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. The only thing that's been 
promised by the State is that they would reduce it to a 
second degree felony in exchange for a guilty plea. Do you 
understand that's the only — only thing that's — that — 
the only guarantee here? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. I haven't decided what the 
sentence would be, and since I'm the one that decides what 
the sentence will be, no one could tell you what the sentence 
will be. In other words, no one can read my mind. And I 
haven't decided it yet, so I can't even tell you what the 
sentence would be. 
So no one — if anybody's made any representations 
about what they think the sentence would be or what it could 
be, you shouldn't rely on that in making your decision to 
plead guilty because you could have the maximum sentence 
imposed. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Has anybody made any other promises to 
you? 
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THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: You've talked with — Mr. Bouwhuis, with 
Mr. Valenciano. Do you feel that he understands what's going 
on? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And do you feel he's doing this 
voluntarily? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I do. 
THE COURT: Okay. Regarding sentencing, I'll listen 
to the recommendations that are made, I'll listen to what the 
State says, I'll read a presentence report and listen to 
AP&P's recommendations, and as well as the recommendations 
your own attorney will make, as well as the statement by you. 
But as I said, I'm not bound to follow anyone's 
recommendations regarding what the sentence would be. 
I'll also advise you that in order for you to 
withdraw your guilty plea, you must file a motion to withdraw 
your guilty plea before you are sentenced, otherwise it will 
not be considered by this Court at this time. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: However, since we're going through this 
in such great detail and I'm asking you all these questions 
about whether you understand it or not, it would be highly 
unlikely that I would let you withdraw your guilty plea, so 
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1 I today's a good day to think very, very seriously about 
2 J whether this is, in fact, what you want to do. Because if 
3 I you move to withdraw your plea later on and you can't show me 
4 I that anything was done that was wrong, I'm probably not going 
5 I to let you withdraw it anyway, even if you filed a motion. 
6 I Do you understand all that? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. BOUWHUIS: Your Honor, I don't know if I 
10 I indicated this. This is going to be an Alford plea. 
11 THE COURT: Yeah. 
12 I MR. BOUWHUIS: Did I — okay. I mentioned that. 
13 I THE COURT: Okay. Let me just reiterate that then. 
14 I Even if you feel you're not guilty, but don't want to go 
15 I through the risk of trial, and you're willing to enter a 
16 I guilty plea to something less, you will be sentenced as if 
17 I you are, in fact, guilty. Do you understand that? 
18 J In other words, if you say I'm going to plead 
19 I guilty, but I'm really not guilty, I'm doing it to avoid the 
20 I risk of conviction, it would not be appropriate for you to 
21 I come on the date of sentencing and say to me, but I'm really 
22 I not guilty so don't sentence me. Because I'm going to be 
23 I sentencing you as if you are, in fact, guilty of a second 
24 I degree felony. 
25 Do you understand all that? 
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. You have 30 days from the date 
you're sentenced — which finalizes your conviction — to 
file an appeal, but you must file it within 30 days from the 
date of appeal -- I mean the date of conviction. And you are 
limited after you've pled guilty by what you can — by what 
you can appeal. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Has anybody promised you anything in 
exchange for pleading guilty? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Are you doing this of your own free will 
and choice? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And are you under the influence of 
anything that would affect your judgment? Alcohol, drugs, or 
anything? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: And are you supposed to be taking any 
kind of prescription drugs or any other kind of drugs that 
would affect your judgment today that you're not taking 
today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any questions that 
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have come to mind that you want to ask either me or 
Mr. Bouwhuis before we proceed? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Okay. And have you understood 
everything today I?ve told you regarding your rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Can I get a factual basis, 
please? 
MS. CORP: Yes, Your Honor. On October 27th of 
2006, Strike Force agents executed a controlled buy at the 
Motel 6. The room that they sent an undercover agent to 
purchase methamphetamine was rented to the defendant. 
The agent used money that had been marked by the 
Strike Force so that it could be later identified. Then 
based on that controlled purchase, they obtained a search 
warrant. 
They went back to the motel room to conduct the 
search and discovered the defendant leaving in a car from 
that location. He was stopped. He consented to a search of 
his vehicle. 
They found evidence, including sheets of paper that 
they're describing as owe sheets, indicating amounts that had 
been sold and — amounts of drugs that had been sold and 
amounts that they had been sold for. And some other 
paraphernalia. 
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Based on that, the defendant was arrested and he was 
searched. In his jacket was found two baggies of 
methamphetamine, one weighing 3.9 grams, the other weighing 
6.9 grams. 
The officer who searched his jacket reached down, 
pulled up his pant leg and out fell a wad of money that 
totaled $1,951. A portion of that money was the marked money 
from the controlled purchase that had been made just prior to 
execution of the search warrant. 
THE COURT: Would you agree that that would be the 
State's evidence at trial? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Yes. He dis — he obviously 
disagrees with those and we111 address those more at 
sentencing, but we agree that that's what they'd present at 
trial. 
THE COURT: All right. How do you plead then to the 
amended charge of a second degree felony, distribution of 
controlled substance? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: I'll accept the plea, find it's 
knowingly and voluntarily entered. The State's offered 
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of 
conviction in the case. 
Sentencing would be August — 
PROBATION OFFICER: 21st. 
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THE COURT: August 21st at two o'clock. Okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Yeah. The other two charges will be 
dismissed. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Your Honor, I — I'm going to be out 
of town on the 21st. 
THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we go to the 28th. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: That would work. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
(Proceedings conclude.) 
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THE COURT: State of Utah versus Davy Valenciano, 
61904066. 
Let me just first say that I realize that there's 
been a motion to withdraw the plea, but the State has 
responded to it already. I took it upon myself simply to go 
ahead and review the tape that I — of the — of the plea 
that I had taken. I've reviewed the State's response. I've 
reviewed what was filed, and I'm prepared to go ahead and 
just handle that today. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. 
MR. LYON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Is there any argument on that motion? I 
realize you — that you filed it, Mr. Bouwhuis, on behalf of 
Mr. Valenciano. The State has responded, and I'm not sure 
anything else is going to be, you know, particularly helpful 
but — 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Right. And I talked to 
Mr. Valenciano about it, and he — the only thing he had to 
say in addition was just to expound on a couple of the 
evidentiary problems, but that — that doesn't change — 
THE COURT: If you want to do that, that's fine, but 
it's — 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, he just indicated that there 
was an item of evidence regarding which room he was found in 
2 
and which room he was supposed to have come from. He 
indicates there's a contradiction in the reports on that and 
also indicates the receipt supposedly showing that he had 
rented the room they thought he was in didn't have his 
signature on it. And so those were evidentiary issues that 
he felt should have been attacked. 
THE COURT: Anything from the State? 
MR. LYON: We'll submit it on the brief. 
THE COURT: Okay. The brief was filed by the State. 
I think that properly states the current status of the law, 
that if the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered and 
there were no Rule 11 violations, there's no basis for 
withdrawing the plea. 
I'm going to deny your motion to withdraw the plea. 
I was particularly interested in reviewing the tape to make 
sure that everything had been done properly. And not only 
did you read the statement in support of the guilty plea, you 
acknowledged that you read and understood it, you — you — I 
also went through in great detail what your rights were in 
addition to what was stated in the — in the statement in 
support of a guilty plea which had been read to you by 
Mr. Bouwhuis. 
I indicated to you that you could file a motion to 
withdraw your plea but it was highly unlikely that I was 
going to grant it if you entered a plea of guilty that day 
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because I felt that after we had gone through it, I had 
answered all your questions, you had had an ample opportunity 
to make a decision about whether you wanted to do this. I 
specifically stated to you are you sure this is what you, in 
fact, want to do. 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor — 
THE COURT: You said that you did, and I'm going to 
deny your motion to withdraw the plea. It was clearly done 
voluntarily. You knew what you were doing. I'm convinced of 
that, and I'm not going to let you withdraw it, just as I 
indicated I wasn't going to absent some showing that we had 
done something wrong at that time. 
I don't think I could have done any more in terms of 
taking the plea in terms of informing you what your rights 
were, gave — giving you ample opportunity to change your 
mind if you wanted to do that. I was certain after talking 
with you at that date that that's, in fact, what you chose to 
do. You voluntarily entered your plea. And — 
THE DEFENDANT: Can I say something? 
THE COURT: Well, I'm — you've just had your 
attorney speak for you. I've reviewed the motion. I'm going 
to deny your motion, and I'm ready to go ahead with 
sentencing, and I — you know, I realize you may have 
something to say with regard to sentencing, but that's fine. 
You can say that. But as far as withdrawing your plea, I'm 
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not going to allow you to do that. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I didn't get a presentence report. I 
got a — 
THE COURT: There wasn't one done because he refused 
to give a — 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Okay. 
THE COURT: — statement. So I'm ready to go ahead 
with — 
THE DEFENDANT: I didn't refuse anything, Your 
Honor. I just told them I wasn't — I had changed my plea 
and I (inaudible) speak to my attorney. 
THE COURT: Right. 
THE DEFENDANT: I wanted to speak to him before I 
did anything. I didn't deny anything, and I — this whole 
case has been messed up. I was under drugs. I was under all 
that. You can see by the picture the way I look now compared 
to when I've got my head on straight. I know what went on 
that day and everything. I wasn't in my right mind when I 
made my decision. You can see — 
THE COURT: That's not what you stated in your 
motion to withdraw your plea, and I specifically asked you at 
the time I took your plea all those questions. So we're not 
going to go back — 
THE DEFENDANT: I sent you a letter saying I — 
that's what happened. I sent you personally saying I 
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wasn't — I was under a lot of stress. Personally I sent you 
a letter when I got incarcerated. 
THE COURT: Ifm not going to let you withdraw your 
plea. This case has been going on and — 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, but it's not my fault — 
THE COURT: No — 
THE DEFENDANT: — it's been going on. 
THE COURT: — just a minute. 
THE DEFENDANT: It's not just me making judgments 
and setting court dates. 
THE COURT: Let's go ahead — I'm willing to go 
ahead with sentencing today. I'm not sure a presentence 
report is going to be all that helpful anyway, given the 
facts of this case and given the charge and given the 
defendant's guilty plea to it. 
So, Mr. Bouwhuis, do you want to go ahead with 
anything? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Well, I guess the challenge I have is 
I don't have a presentence report. I don't know what his 
record is. I don't know the standard things that we would 
have with a presentence report regarding his background, 
employment, the family, substance abuse history, and whatnot, 
so I'm not really prepared on this. 
MR. LYON: We'll leave it to Your Honor's 
discretion. The State's — I've had a chance to briefly 
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review his criminal record. I think it's a prison -- I think 
it should be a prison recommendation, but we'll leave it to 
Your Honor's discretion. 
THE COURT: Well, you know, I suppose to avoid any 
problem in the future I'll get a presentence report. I'm not 
sure it's going to be helpful because, frankly, dealing drugs 
is a prison offense as far as I'm concerned — 
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor — 
THE COURT: — especially in a case like this. I'll 
get a presentence report. That's the end of that. Okay? 
I'm reluctant to do it, but I'll do it because I don't want 
any criticism later on so — 
PROBATION OFFICER: October 9th, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: October 9th at 2:00 o'clock you'll be 
sentenced on this charge. 
THE BAILIFF: Let's go. Let's go. 
THE DEFENDANT: Speak to him? 
THE BAILIFF: Nope. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(End of proceedings.) 
7 
